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Abstract Based on a gambling formulation of quantum mechanics, we derive a Gleason-
type theorem that holds for any dimension n of a quantum system, and in particular for n= 2.
The theorem states that the only logically consistent probability assignments are exactly
the ones that are definable as the trace of the product of a projector and a density matrix
operator. In addition, we detail the reason why dispersion-free probabilities are actually not
valid, or rational, probabilities for quantum mechanics, and hence should be excluded from
consideration.
1 Introduction
Born’s rule is a law of Quantum Mechanics (QM) that gives the probability that a measure-
ment on a quantum system will yield a given result. This rule was initially considered a
postulate of QM, but then it was investigated whether it could actually be derived as a the-
orem from other postulates of QM. Given reasonable assumptions, Gleason (1957) showed
that probabilities in QM are expressible as the trace of the product of a projector and a
density operator. Gleason’s theorem is nowadays one of the fundamental theorems in QM.
The issue with Gleason’s proof is that it is long and complicated; and it only applies
to quantum systems of dimension greater than two. For n = 2, Gleason’s theorem leaves
room for the existence of probabilities that are not expressible as the trace of the product
of a projector and a density operator. An example of these probabilities are the so-called
dispersion-free probabilities Bell (1966) (Kochen and Specker, 1967, Sec. 6); these proba-
bilities only take values 0 or 1. An open question is whether they are valid probabilities, or
more generally whether there is any valid probability that is not expressible as the trace of
the product of a projector and a density operator.
1.1 Digression about classical probability
In classical subjective, or Bayesian, probability, there is a well-established way to check
whether the probability assignments of a certain subject, whom we call Alice, about the
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result of an uncertain experiment is valid, in the sense that they are self-consistent—we call
them coherent. The idea is to use these probability assignments to define odds, which are the
inverses of probabilities, about the results of the experiment (e.g., Head or Tail in the case of
a coin toss) and show that there is no gamble in this betting system that leads Alice to a sure
loss, that is, to losing money no matter the outcome of the experiment. Historically this is
also referred to as the impossibility to make a Dutch book; and Alice is regarded as coherent,
or rational, if she chooses her odds so that no Dutch book is possible. De Finetti (1937)
showed that Kolmogorov’s probability axioms can be derived by imposing the principle of
coherence alone on a subject’s odds about an uncertain experiment.
Williams (1975) and Walley (1991) have later shown that it is possible to follow de
Finetti’s tradition and ideas to justify probability while making things even simpler and
more elegant. Their approach is also more general than de Finetti’s, because coherence is
defined without any explicit reference to probability (which is also what allows coherence to
be generalised to other domains, such as quantum mechanics); the idea is to work in a dual
space of gambles. To understand this framework, we consider an experiment whose outcome
ω belongs to a certain space of possibilities Ω (e.g., Head or Tail). We can model Alice’s
beliefs about ω by asking her whether she accepts engaging in certain risky transactions,
called gambles, whose outcome depends on the actual outcome of the experiment. Mathe-
matically, a gamble is a bounded real-valued function on Ω , g :Ω →R, which is interpreted
as an uncertain reward in a linear utility scale. If Alice accepts a gamble g, this means that
she commits herself to receive g(ω) utiles1 if the outcome of the experiment eventually hap-
pens to be the event ω ∈Ω . Since g(ω) can be negative, Alice can also lose utiles. Therefore
Alice’s acceptability of a gamble depends on her knowledge about the experiment.
The set of gambles that Alice accepts is called her set of desirable (or acceptable) gam-
bles. One such set is said to be coherent when it satisfies the following criteria:2
1. Any gamble g 6= 0 such that g(ω)≥ 0 for each ω ∈Ω must be desirable for Alice, given
that it may increase Alice’s capital without ever decreasing it (accepting partial gain).
2. Any gamble g such that g(ω)≤ 0 for each ω ∈Ω must not be desirable for Alice, given
that it may only decrease Alice’s capital without ever increasing it (avoiding partial
loss).
3. If Alice finds g to be desirable, then also λgmust be desirable for her for any 0< λ ∈R
(positive homogeneity).
4. If Alice finds g1 and g2 desirable, then she also must accept g1+g2 (additivity).
Note how these four axioms express some truly minimal requirements: the first means that
Alice likes to increase her wealth; the second that she does not like to decrease it; the third
and fourth together simply rephrase the assumption that Alice’s utility scale is linear.
In spite of the simple character of these requirements, these four axioms alone define
a very general theory of probability. De Finetti’s (Bayesian) theory is the particular case
obtained by additionally imposing some regularity (continuity) requirement and especially
completeness, that is, the idea that a subject should always be capable of comparing options
Williams (1975); Walley (1991).3 On the other hand, Zaffalon and Miranda (2015) have
shown that Axioms 1–4 above are equivalent, under the assumption of linearity of utility, to
the decision-theoretic axiomatisation of incomplete preferences in the classical tradition of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) (see, e.g., Galaabaatar and Karni (2013)).
1 Abstract units of utility, indicating the satisfaction derived from an economic transaction.
2 For an example see Benavoli et al (2016, Example 1).
3 By enforcing those requirements, partial and sure (Dutch book) losses become equivalent.
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This is to say that Axioms 1–4 have a very long history as a solid axiomatic foundation
of rationality. And it is precisely their emphasis on rationality that allows us to connect them
to quantum mechanics, as we describe next.
1.2 Back to quantum mechanics
In Benavoli et al (2016), we have generalised Williams-Walley’s gambling system to QM
and shown that, by imposing the same rationality criteria, it is possible to derive all the four
postulates of QM as a consequence of rational gambling on a quantum experiment. This is
tantamount to showing that QM is the Bayesian theory generalised to the space of Hermitian
matrices. It has “probabilities” (density matrices), Bayes’ rule (measurement), marginalisa-
tion (partial tracing), independence (tensor product). In this framework, QM probability as-
signments computed via Born’s rule are derived quantities, and they are proved to represent
valid (coherent/self-consistent/rational) probability assignments.
The present paper uses these results to:
1. show that dispersion-free probabilities are incoherent and
2. derive a stronger version of Gleason’s theorem that holds in any dimension, through
much a simpler proof, which states that: all coherent probability assignments in QM
must be obtained as the trace of the product of a projector and a density operator.
1.3 Related work
In recent times, several attempts have been made to find a Gleason-type theorem whose
applicability covers the two-dimensional case too. A notable generalisation of Gleason’s
theorem holding in any finitely dimensional Hilbert space has been obtained by relaxing the
orthogonality constraint on the measurement operators. More specifically, observables are
identified with positive operator valued measurements (POVMs) Holevo (1982), which are
defined by any partition of the identity operator into a set of ℓ positive operators Ei—called
effects—, acting on an n-dimensional Hilbert space and representing the outcomes of the
measurement. A generalized probability measure is then defined on the set of all effects,
that is, the positive operators that can occur in the range of a POVM. All such generalized
probability measures are then proven to be of the standard form, i.e., determined by a density
operator (p(Ei) = trace(ρEi)). The one-to-one relationship between generalized probability
measures on the effects and density operators was first derived by Holevo (1973) (see also
(Holevo, 1982, Sec. 1.6.1.)). More recently, Busch (2003) has re-derived it with the goal of
providing a simplified proof of Gleason’s theorem that also covers the two-dimensional case.
The same approach has been pursued by Caves et al (2004), and a further generalisation is
provided by Barnett et al (2014).
However, probability measures defined on effects are peculiar. POVMs can in fact be
regarded as imperfect observations, since they are not repeatable.
On another side, the idea of justifying QM from rationality principles on a gambling sys-
temwas proposed in the Bayesian interpretation of QM (QBism), see for instance Caves et al
(2002); Fuchs and Schack (2013, 2011); Mermin (2014) and Pitowsky’s quantum gambles
Pitowsky (2003, 2006). These attempts have mostly focused on the probabilities that can be
derived from QM; we argue instead that QM itself is the Bayesian theory of probability—
extended so as to enable it to deal with quantum experiments. For a detailed discussion about
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similarities and differences between our framework and QBism we refer to Benavoli et al
(2016, Section 8).
2 Quantum gambling system
We start by defining a gambling system about the results of a quantum experiment. To this
end, we consider two subjects: the bookmaker and the gambler (Alice). The bookmaker
prepares the quantum system in some quantum state. Alice has her personal knowledge
(beliefs) about the experiment—possibly no knowledge at all.
1. The bookmaker announces that he will measure the quantum system along its n or-
thogonal directions and so the outcome of the measurement is an element of Ω =
{ω1, . . . ,ωn}, with ωi denoting the elementary event “detection along i”. Mathemati-
cally, it means that the quantum system is measured along its eigenvectors,4 i.e., the
projectors5 Π ∗ = {Π ∗1 , . . . ,Π ∗n} and ωi is the event “indicated” by the i-th projector.
The bookmaker is fair, meaning that he will correctly perform the experiment and report
the actual results to Alice.
2. Before the experiment, Alice declares the set of gambles she is willing to accept. Math-
ematically, a gamble G on this experiment is a Hermitian matrix in Cn×n, the space of
all Hermitian n×n matrices being denoted by Cn×nh . We will denote the set of gambles
Alice is willing to accept by K ⊆Cn×nh .
3. By accepting a gamble G, Alice commits herself to receive γi ∈ R utiles if the outcome
of the experiment eventually happens to be ωi. The value γi is defined from G and Π
∗
as follows:
Π ∗i GΠ
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i for i= 1, . . . ,n. (1)
It is a real number since G is Hermitian.
Denote by H + = {G ∈ Cn×nh :G 0} the subset of all positive semi-definite and non-zero
(PSDNZ) matrices in Cn×nh : we call them the set of positive gambles. The set of negative
gambles is similarly given by H − = {G ∈ Cn×nh : G  0}. Alice examines the gambles
in Cn×nh and comes up with the subset K of the gambles that she finds desirable. Alice’s
rationality is characterised as follows.
Definition 1 (Rationality criteria)
1. Any gamble G ∈Cn×nh such that G 0 must be desirable for Alice, given that it may in-
crease Alice’s utiles without ever decreasing them (accepting partial gain). This means
that H + ⊆K .
2. Any gamble G ∈Cn×nh such that G 0 must not be desirable for Alice, given that it may
only decrease Alice’s utiles without ever increasing them (avoiding partial loss). This
means that H −∩K = /0.
3. If Alice finds G desirable, that is G ∈K , then also νGmust be desirable for her for any
0< ν ∈ R (positive homogeneity).
4. If Alice finds G1 and G2 desirable, that is G1,G2 ∈K , then she must also accept G1+
G2, i.e., G1+G2 ∈K (additivity).
4 We mean the eigenvectors of the density matrix of the quantum system.
5 A projector Π is a set of n positive semi-definite matrices in Cn×nh such that ΠiΠk = 0, (Πi)
2 = Πi =
(Πi)
†, ∑ni=1 Πi = I.
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To understand these rationality criteria, originally presented in Benavoli et al (2016, Sec.
III), we must remember that mathematically the payoff for any gamble G is computed as
Π ∗i GΠ
∗
i if the outcome of the experiment is the event indicated by Π
∗
i . Then the first two
rationality criteria above hold no matter the experiment Π ∗ that is eventually performed. In
fact, from the properties of PSDNZ matrices, if G  0 then Π ∗i GΠ
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i with γ
∗
i ≥ 0
for any i and γ j > 0 for some j. Therefore, by accepting G 0, Alice can only increase her
utiles. Symmetrically, if G  0 then Π ∗i GΠ
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i with γi ≤ 0 for any i. Alice must then
avoid the gambles G  0 because they can only decrease her utiles. This justifies the first
two rationality criteria. For the last two, observe that
Π ∗i (G1+G2)Π
∗
i = Π
∗
i G1Π
∗
i +Π
∗
i G2Π
∗
i = (γi+ϑi)Π
∗
i ,
where we have exploited the fact that Π ∗i G1Π
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i and Π
∗
i G2Π
∗
i = ϑiΠ
∗
i . Hence, if
Alice accepts G1,G2, she must also accept G1 +G2 because this will lead to a reward of
γi +ϑi. Similarly, if G is desirable for Alice, then also Π
∗
i (νG)Π
∗
i = νΠ
∗
i GΠ
∗
i should be
desirable for any ν > 0.
In other words, as in the case of classical desirability described in Section 1.1, the four
conditions above state only minimal requirements: that Alice would like to increase her
wealth and not decrease it (conditions 1 and 2); and that Alice’s utility scale is linear (con-
ditions 3 and 4). The first two conditions should be plainly uncontroversial. The linearity of
the utility scale is routinely assumed in the theories of personal, and in particular Bayesian,
probability as a way to isolate considerations of uncertainty from those of value (wealth).
We can characterise K also from a geometric point of view. In fact, from the above
properties, it follows that Alice’s set of desirable gambles mathematically satisfies the fol-
lowing properties.
Definition 2 Let K be a subset of Cn×nh . We say that K is a coherent set of strictly
desirable gambles (SDG) if
(S1) K is a non-pointed convex-cone (positive homogeneity and additivity);
(S2) if G 0 then G ∈K (accepting partial gain);
(S3) if G ∈ K then either G  0 or G− εI ∈ K for some strictly positive real number ε
(openness).6
Note that the although the additional openness property (S3) is not necessary for rationality,
it is technically convenient as it precisely isolates the kind of models we use in QM (as well
as in classical probability) Benavoli et al (2016). Property (S3) has a gambling interpretation
too: it means that we will only consider gambles that are strictly desirable for Alice; these
are the gambles for which Alice expects gaining something—even an epsilon of utiles. Note
that assumptions (S1) and (S2) imply that SDG also avoids partial loss: ifG 0, thenG /∈K
(Benavoli et al, 2016, Remark III.2).
Definition 3 An SDG is said to be maximal if there is no larger SDG containing it.
In Benavoli et al (2016), we have shown that maximal SDGs and density matrices are
one-to-one. The mapping between them is obtained through the standard inner product in
Cn×nh , i.e., G ·R= Tr(G†R) with G,R ∈Cn×nh . This follows by a representation result whose
proof is a direct application of Hahn-Banach theorem:
6 In Benavoli et al (2016) we used another formulation of openness, namely (S3’): if G ∈ K then either
G 0 or G−∆ ∈K for some 0< ∆ ∈ Cn×nh . (S3) and (S3’) are provably equivalent given (S1) and (S2).
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Theorem 21 (Representation theorem from Benavoli et al (2016)) The map that associates
a maximal SDG the unique density matrix ρ such that
Tr(G†ρ)≥ 0 ∀G ∈K (2)
defines a bijective correspondence between maximal SDGs and density matrices. Its inverse
is the map (·)◦ that associates each density matrix ρ the maximal SDG7
(ρ)◦ = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G 0}∪{G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†ρ)> 0}. (3)
This representation theorem has several consequences. First, it provides a gambling interpre-
tation of the first axiom of QM on density operators. Second, it shows that density operators
are coherent, since the set (ρ)◦ that they induce in (3) is a valid SDG. This also implies
that QM is self-consistent—a gambler that uses QM to place bets on a quantum experiment
cannot be made a partial (and, thus, sure) loser. Third, the first axiom of QM on Cn×nh is
structurally and formally equivalent to Kolmogorov’s first and second axioms about proba-
bilities onRn (Benavoli et al, 2016, Sec. 2). In fact, they can be both derived via duality from
a coherent set of desirable gambles on Cn×nh and, respectively, R
n. In Benavoli et al (2016)
we have also derived Born’s rule and the other three axioms of QM as a consequence of
rational gambling on a quantum experiment and show that that measurement, partial tracing
and tensor product are equivalent to the probabilistic notions of Bayes’ rule, marginalisation
and independence. We will now use these results to prove the two main results of the present
paper.
3 The incoherence of dispersion-free probability measures
Let P(Cn×nh ) be the lattice of orthogonal projectors in C
n×n
h . Gleason’s theorem relies on
the fact that a function p :P(Cn×nh )→ [0,1] to be called a probability measure has to satisfy
the following properties:
(P1) p(In) = 1,
(P2) p(∑mi=1 Πi) = ∑
m
i=1 p(Πi), for each sequence (Π1, . . . ,Πm) of mutually orthogonal pro-
jectors, and m≤ n.
Property (P2), usually called non-contextuality, asserts that the probability measure associ-
ated to a Hilbert subspace is independent of the choice of the basis. It implies that, given
a Hermitian matrix G ∈ Cn×nh , if G = ∑mi=1 λiΠi and G = ∑kℓ=1 γℓΠ ′ℓ are two different de-
compositions obtained from the Spectral Decomposition Theorem,8 then ∑mi=1 λip(Πi) =
∑kℓ=1 γℓp(Π
′
ℓ).
The crucial point is whether Properties (P1) and (P2) are strong enough to characterise
only valid probabilities—that those two conditions appear as a straightforward extension of
the classical probability axioms to QM does not mean that they represent the most appropri-
ate way to define probabilities in such a generalised setting.
Our standpoint, as it follows from de Finetti’s investigation, is that the essence of proba-
bility is the idea of rationality (self-consistency). This is captured by the coherence axioms,
7 Here the gambles G 0 are treated separately because they are always desirable and, thus, they are not
informative on Alice’s beliefs about the quantum system. Alice’s knowledge is determined by the gambles
that are not G 0.
8 This happens when an eigevalue has multiplicity greater than one.
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which are more primitive than the probability axioms; in this sense, they are better candi-
dates to extend the probability to QM.
To verify this idea, we first need to define what is a coherent probability. We start by
defining the expectation associated to a probability measure p as
Ep(G) =
n
∑
i=1
λip(Πi),
where ∑ni=1 λiΠi is the decomposition of G.
The set of desirable gambles associated to p is thus defined as
Kp = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G 0 or Ep(G)> 0},
i.e., all G 0 (that are always desirable) and all G whose expectation w.r.t. p is greater than
zero. Therefore, we say that:
Definition 4 A probability measure p : P(Cn×nh )→ [0,1] is coherent if Kp is a coherent
set of strictly desirable gambles.
Thus, from the Bayesian perspective adopted here, a probability measure p satisfying (P1)
and (P2) is coherent whenever the set of desirable gambles Kp implied by p is a coherent
SDG.
Consider the Hilbert space C2×2h , and in particular dispersion-free probability measures,
which are those that assign only the values 0 and 1.
To define them, we exploit the fact that any projector can be written as
Πn =
1
2
(I+n ·σ ),
where n ∈R3, ||n||= 1 and σ is the Pauli matrices basis. Its orthogonal vector is Π−n, since
Πn+Π−n = I, and ΠnΠ−n = 0. Note that any 0 6= G ∈ C2×2h can be uniquely decomposed,
i.e., there is a unique projector Πn such that G= λ1Πn+λ2Π−n, for some λ1,λ2 ∈ R.
Definition 5 A 2D dispersion-free probability measure is any function p :P(C2×2h )→ [0,1]
defined as
p(Πn) =


1 if n · x> 0 or
if n · x= 0, n · y> 0 or
if n · x= 0, n · y= 0, n · z> 0,
0 otherwise,
(4)
for some orthogonal vectors x,y,z ∈ R3.
We now show with an example that dispersion-free probabilities are incoherent.
Example 1 Without loss of generality let us assume that x = (1,0,0), y = (0,1,0), z =
(0,0,1). Consider then the gamble
G= λ1Πg+λ2Π−g =

 − 14 54
(
1− i√2
)
5
4
(
1+ i
√
2
)
− 11
4

 ,
with λ1 = 1, λ2 = −4 and g = (1/2,1/
√
2,1/2). This gamble is clearly desirable, and thus
in Kp, since g · x> 0 and λ1 = 1> 0 and so Ep(G) = 1.
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Consider now the gamble
H = γ1Πh+ γ2Π−h =

 − 114 54
(
1+ i
√
2
)
5
4
(
1− i√2
)
− 1
4

 ,
with γ1 = 1, γ2 = −4 and h = (1/2,−1/
√
2,−1/2). This gamble is also desirable since
h · x> 0 and γ1 = 1> 0 and so Ep(H) = 1, meaning H ∈Kp.
Let F = G+H. Notice that
F =
[
−3 5
2
5
2
−3
]
,
which we can rewrite as ρ1Π f +ρ2Π− f with ρ1 = − 12 , ρ2 = − 112 and f = (1,0,0) and so
F < 0. Since f · x> 0, we have that E[F ] =− 1
2
< 0. As a result Alice is incoherent. In fact
by accepting G and H, she should also be willing to accept F by additivity (Axiom 3 in
Definition 1). But this means that Alice would incur a sure loss (a Dutch book), which is a
strong form of irrationality. ♦
Stated differently, the example shows that dispersion-free probabilities are logically incon-
sistent with the axioms of QM and therefore should not be regarded as, nor called, probabil-
ities. In the next section we detail the formal argument.
4 A subjective extension of Gleason’s theorem
We will now show that the only coherent probabilities are those that can be defined as the
trace of the product of a projector and a density operator (it is well known that dispersion-
free probabilities cannot be defined in this way; see, e.g., Heinosaari and Ziman (2011)).
We first characterise sets of gambles defined by coherent probability measures.
Proposition 41 If p : P(Cn×nh ) → [0,1] is a coherent probability measure, then Kp is a
maximal SDG.
Proof Since p is coherent, we know that Kp is a coherent set of desirable gambles. It is then
enough to check that it satisfies the openness condition (S3) and maximality. For openness,
assume G = ∑ni λiΠi ∈ Kp, meaning Ep(G) > 0. Consider any ε > 0 such that Ep(G)−
ε > 0 and let F = G− εI = ∑ni (λi − ε)Πi. Then Ep(F) = ∑ni (λi − ε)p(Πi) = Ep(G)−
ε(∑ni p(Πi)) = Ep(G)− ε p(I2) = Ep(G)− ε > 0. Hence F ∈Kp.
For maximality, we reason as follows. Assume once more G= ∑ni λiΠi /∈Kp, meaning
Ep(G)≤ 0. Assume moreover that there is an SDG K ′ ⊃Kp such that G ∈K ′. By open-
ness, F = G− εI ∈ K ′ for some ε > 0. This means that Ep(F) < 0, and thus −F ∈ Kp.
Since K ′ is an SDG, then −F+F = 0 ∈K ′, a contradiction.
Everything is now ready to obtain the following subjective extension of Gleason’s theo-
rem:
Theorem 42 For every n> 0, a probability measure p :P(Cn×nh )→ [0,1] is coherent if and
only if it is of the form
p(Πℓ) = Tr(Πℓρ),
for a unique density matrix ρ ∈ Cn×nh .
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Proof The fact that p(Πℓ) defined from ρ via Tr(Πℓρ) is a coherent probability measure
follows from Theorem 21 and Proposition 41.
Conversely, let p be a coherent probability measure. From Theorem 21 and Proposition
41, there is a unique ρ such that Kp = (ρ)
◦. Assume there is a projector Πℓ such that
p(Πℓ) 6= Tr(Πℓρ). Observe that the case Tr(Πℓρ) < p(Πℓ) can be led back to that with the
reversed inequality by considering the orthogonal projector (In−Πℓ).
Let us therefore consider the case that Tr(Πℓρ) > p(Πℓ) ≥ 0. Assume that p(Πℓ) =
Ep(Πℓ) = 0, whence p(In−Πℓ) = 1. Fix ε > 0 and let G= λ1Πℓ+λ2(In−Πℓ), where
λ1 = ε +
1
Tr(Πℓρ)
and λ2 =
{
−1 if Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ) = 0,
− 1
Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ) otherwise.
It holds that G 6≥ 0 and Ep(G)< 0. This means that G /∈Kp. On the other hand,
Tr(G†ρ) = λ1Tr(Πℓρ)+λ2Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ) = εTr(Πℓρ)+
{
1 if Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ) = 0,
0 otherwise.
Hence Tr(G†ρ)> 0, meaning that G ∈ (ρ)◦, a contradiction.
Finally, let us consider the case that Tr(Πℓρ)> p(Πℓ)> 0. Notice that Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ)<
p(In−Πℓ). In this case too Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ)> 0, otherwise, by reasoning as before, we could
find a contradiction. Hence, we obtain that
Tr(Πℓρ)
p(Πℓ)
> 1 and Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ)
p(In−Πℓ) < 1. Let λ =
1
p(Πℓ)
,
µ =− 1
p(In−Πℓ) and G= λΠℓ+µ(In−Πℓ). Given that G 6≥ 0 and that, trivially, Ep(G) = 0,
it holds that G /∈ Kp. But Tr(G†ρ) = Tr(Πℓρ)p(Πℓ) −
Tr((In−Πℓ)ρ)
p(In−Πℓ) > 0, meaning that G ∈ (ρ)
◦, a
contradiction.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that a subject who uses dispersion-free probabilities to accept gambles on
a quantum experiment can always be made a sure loser: she loses utiles no matter the out-
come of the experiment. We say that dispersion-free probabilities are incoherent, which
means that they are logically inconsistent with the axioms of QM. Moreover, using such a
betting framework, we have proved that the only logically consistent probabilities are those
that agree with Born rule. We find remarkable that these results are obtained by only us-
ing logical considerations and very simple arguments. This has been made possible by our
recent reformulation of QM as a logic of uncertainty for quantum experiments.
The results obtained in this paper extend the scope of Gleason’s theorem (Gleason, 1957)
to any dimension. We believe that our formulation of the theorem does not suffer from prob-
lematic interpretations like those, for instance, of the extension presented by Busch (2003)
that employs positive operator valued measurements (POVMs). Indeed, we work directly
with the space of projectors and use a well-established way from classical approaches to
rationality to check whether some given probabilistic assessments are self-consistent. As
future work, we plan to use this gambling interpretation of QM to investigate the validity of
the various hidden variable models. In particular, we aim at exploring how far one can go in
defining hidden variable models while staying rational.
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